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Chapter 12
The Role of Human Dignity in Processing 
(Health) Data Building on the Organ Trade 
Prohibition
Anne E. de Hingh and Arno R. Lodder
Abstract The datafication, commodification, and commercialization of our exis-
tence as an inevitable part of the online infrastructure of today not only affects our 
privacy but it goes deeper by touching upon even more fundamental conditions of 
being human. In this chapter, bio-medical regulations prohibiting the trade of human 
body parts are explored to see whether the non-commercialization principle in these 
laws is helpful in assessing data processing practices. An analogy between data 
processing and organ trade may help us to develop a new perspective on what con-
stitutes improper commercial use of personal data and find ways to prohibit (repre-
hensible aspects of) the trade in personal data. We propose to reorient the debate on 
data processing by introducing the notion of human dignity as constraint into the 
discussion. A prohibition of personal data commercialism (analogous to a prohibi-
tion of transplant commercialism) could contribute to a more future-proof regula-
tion of data processing activities.
1  Introduction
The effects of harvesting personal data by large commercial entities, such as inter-
net companies, social media, and internet service providers, are at least threefold. 
First, virtually all aspects of our lives are converted into computerized data (datafi-
cation, see e.g. Newell and Marabelli 2015). Subsequently, our identities, habits, 
and behavior are transformed into new forms of value or commodities (commodifi-
cation, see e.g. Schwartz 2004). Finally, as our personal data and consumer profiles 
represent high values, they are purchased, processed, and sold on over and over 
again (commercialization, see e.g. Smutny et al. 2017). The worldwide data broker 
industry, which thrives on the fact that personal data generate economic value, 
makes for great revenues.1
1 OECD (2013).
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The datafication, commodification, and commercialization of our existence as an 
inevitable part of the online infrastructure of today not only affects our privacy but 
it goes deeper by touching upon even more fundamental conditions of being human. 
In this chapter, bio-medical regulations prohibiting the trade of human body parts 
are explored to see whether the non-commercialization principle in these laws is 
helpful in assessing data processing practices. An analogy between data processing 
and organ trade may help us to develop a new perspective on what constitutes 
improper commercial use of personal data and find ways to prohibit (reprehensible 
aspects of) the trade in personal data.
There is another reason for our approach. Since the nineteenth century, the world 
is connected via telex, telephony, fax, and most recently, computers. This latter 
network, of connected computers, known as the internet, is gradually moving into a 
next phase. Besides PCs and from later date smartphones and tablets, presently all 
kinds of objects, such as toothbrushes, wearables, TVs and cameras, are connected 
to the internet. The internet of bodies is a subspecies of this internet of things, and 
represents the connected body. This internet of bodies facilitates communication 
about, e.g. the performance of implants, as well as the health condition of the indi-
vidual being monitored. Moreover, pace makers can be connected, insulin levels can 
be measured at a distance, eventually followed by automatic injections. All kinds of 
sensitive data are communicated about a person’s health, like general condition, 
heartbeat, blood pressure, etc.
Now the processing of data gets close to and even enters our bodies, Article 3(2) 
of the EU Charter springs to mind: “the prohibition on making the human body and 
its parts as such a source of financial gain”. This article was not drafted with data 
processing in mind, but covers, e.g. slavery and human trafficking in relation to the 
body and its parts. One could, however, argue that the data being transferred from 
human implants and wearables is in conflict with this fundamental right. Companies 
are making money with parts of the human body, viz. data (in)directly related to our 
body. More generally, one could question to what extent human dignity asks for 
protection against the processing of (health) data. Hence, Article 1 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights does state “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected 
and protected.”
In relation to trade in body parts, governments set limits to the free choice of its 
citizens, even in criminal law. In May 2015, Marc H. put an advertisement on 
Marktplaats.nl, the Dutch eBay, to sell his kidney for the sum of 50,000 euros. He 
was arrested by the police soon afterwards but acquitted because of insufficient 
evidence for financial gain. As the suspect had not yet received any offer, the pur-
pose of financial gain could not be sufficiently demonstrated—advertising body 
parts alone was considered insufficient evidence for the purpose of financial gain. In 
this chapter, we do not focus on eventual sanctions, be it criminal, administrative, or 
civil, but explore the underlying principles for regulating the processing of (health) 
data.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the light of the focus of our chapter (an 
analogy between data processing and the organ trade prohibition), we discuss some 
relevant assumptions of data protection law. Subsequently, the analogy between 
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data processing and trade in body parts is explored. We aim to strengthen our obser-
vations related to the analogy between trade in body parts and data processing in 
general with a discussion of the processing of health data, and briefly touch upon 
paternalism (Husak 2009).
2  Need for a Change in Application of Data Protection Law
The topic of this paper is part of a broader argument in the context of data protection 
law (Bygrave 2018). Our concern with data protection law, not only relates to the 
fact that gradually more intimate data is being processed. This is actually one side 
of the spectrum, the processing of (very) sensitive data. This is what the GDPR 
does, to some extent, regulate, because in principle it is not allowed to process spe-
cial categories of data such as health data (Article 9(1) GDPR). However, there are 
exceptions to this rule, e.g. in case the data were manifestly made public by the data 
subject (Article 9(2)(e) GDPR). The other end of the spectrum is personal data to 
which data processing rules apply, but where one can question whether data protec-
tion law for these data is necessary in the first place. We start this chapter by briefly 
discussing what we would like to call different flavors of data processing.
Many observe the discrepancy between the scope of GDPR norms and the effect 
these norms have in practice. We believe that data protection law, as it exists today, 
is too straightforwardly simple. The GDPR distinguishes special categories of data, 
but besides that the same norms apply to a controller/processor not interested at all 
in the personal data that are being processed (e.g. ERP cloud providers), controllers 
who have a small business and only use personal data to deliver goods, controllers 
whose business model is based on data analytics, etc. A possible reason might be 
that the drafters of the norms do not provide the data protection law framework with 
empirical backing, cf. Bamberger and Mulligan (2015):
This absence of empirical assessment of regulatory impact on the practice of privacy leaves 
legal reformers shooting in the dark, without a real understanding of the ways in which 
previous regulatory attempts have either promoted or thwarted privacy’s protection.
What is happening right now is that big data processors like Facebook and 
Google largely can continue with their business as usual, whereas all kind of small 
players like sport clubs, schools, stores, are outright panicking about the conse-
quences of the GDPR, in this context commonly referred to as “The new privacy 
law”. Also in academia, there is a tendency to ask for permission of processing of 
totally innocent use, e.g. asking permission to a group of 15 people in the same 
room, for the same reasons, to share the e-mail addresses—funny enough they 
already did when sending the invitation…
Thus, the data protection norms that apply to Google, Facebook, and the likes are 
the same as those that apply to the next corner butcher and flower shop or the cloud 
provider only providing the tech to process data cannot be left unnoticed. A physical 
analogy for the latter situation is that the company that stores boxes with personal 
12 The Role of Human Dignity in Processing (Health) Data Building on the Organ…
264
data is controller/processor. We want to start a discussion on differentiation of data 
processing regimes. What we propose is tentative, and is meant as a starting position 
rather than a well worked out division. We suggest to distinguish the following four 
categories, ranging from most infringing (1) to hardly infringing if at all:
 1. Processing is in principle forbidden, but the DPA can license the processing 
activity. One category might be the processing of health data for commercial 
purposes. Article 9(2)(a) GDPR provides this option to Member States, to allow 
data subject to lift the prohibition of processing as defined in Article 9(1) 
GDPR. Markou (2011) did propose a ban for the processing of sensitive data in 
the context of commercial profiling and personalized advertising. Sometimes 
processing of health data is inevitable, e.g., for insurance companies. They will 
thus get a license. A more controversial category is to prohibit the business 
model that is solely based on the processing of personal data.
 2. The current framework. The GDPR as it is right now should apply to all data 
processing activities that do not fall under one of the other categories.
 3. GDPR light. A basic set of rules, based on Article 5 GDPR. An organization 
needs to demonstrate that they act in accordance with the data protection prin-
ciples listed in Article 5. This category applies based on for what purpose the 
data is being processed, and the nature and number of data being processed.
 4. Processing is allowed, but security measures must be taken. This category applies 
to parties processing data as a service (e.g. cloud providers), and do nothing with 
the data other than storing the data or providing the services necessary to process 
the data.
We suggest the data protection framework, or at least its application, should bet-
ter consider the nature of the data and the purpose for which the data is being pro-
cessed along the lines just sketched. We do not further elaborate on this topic in this 
paper in general, but as a first step concentrate on how the data protection norms 
related to health data could be reconsidered.
3  Data Protection in General: Data Subject Responsible
Current laws and regulations on privacy and data protection heavily rely on the 
concept of informational self-determination (Cavoukian 2015)—the ability of indi-
viduals to have control over the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal 
information—on autonomous choice and consent (Austin 2014). This is what 
Solove (2013) refers to as “privacy self-management”: rights that provide people 
with control over their own personal data. According to Solove, this control helps 
people to “decide for themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the collec-
tion, use and disclosure of their information”. He argues that it would be paternalis-
tic to protect people against their own bad decisions: “people make decisions all the 
time that are not in their best interest. People relinquish rights and take bad risks, 
and the law often does not stop them.”
A. E. de Hingh and A. R. Lodder
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In this interpretation, the regulatory framework presumes a high degree of con-
sumer knowledge, a freedom of choice and autonomous, “empowered” consumers. 
In practice, however, in particular online consumers are all but empowered indi-
viduals. Due to a lack of transparency in the market, and the absence of a true 
choice, consumers cannot take up responsibility for the protection of their own per-
sonal data (Zwitter 2014).
Consumers who want to make use of free online services and social media, like 
Google, Facebook, or the apps on their phones do not have real choice but to agree 
to the terms and conditions. This is not a matter of free choice, but of enforced 
choice (Carolan 2016). The current system is based on coercion, forcing consumers 
to accept all terms and conditions of search engines, websites, and social media just 
by clicking “OK” and to agree to the commercial use of their personal data. As the 
Minister of Economic Affairs of Cyprus phrased it at the conference in Nicosia 
November 2017: “The statement that someone has read terms and conditions is the 
biggest lie of the century.”
Consumers, most of the time, are not really aware what personal data is being 
collected by companies, and are therefore not familiar with the data protection risks 
they run. Online reality outpaces “the idea that it is possible or desirable for every 
individual to monitor and manage a shifting collection of privacy settings of which 
they may only be dimly aware” (Richards and King 2014). Even if consumers read 
a privacy policy, it is almost never sufficiently clear for the person concerned that 
his personal data are used and for what purpose (Zuiderveen Borgesius 2014). How 
many LinkedIn users were aware of the possibility that their personal profiles were 
sold to third parties, and eventually to Microsoft? As Whittington and Hoofnagle 
(2012) remark: “Having spent time reading a privacy policy, the consumer may still 
not discover critical terms, such as whether the company sells personal information 
to third parties. Many privacy policies use vague, innocuous-sounding terms to 
mask third-party information sharing”.
Consequently, consent in current data protection law has become “tainted” by 
unfair bargaining conditions and has lost its effectiveness altogether (Schermer 
et  al. 2014). A lack of knowledge and information renders the classical privacy/
consent based framework inadequate. Any form of self-determination on the deci-
sion whether one should share or sell his or her personal data has become illusory.
The objections with regard to the underlying principles of privacy law and data 
regulation are acknowledged by many, but satisfactory solutions are difficult to 
come up with. For example, Opinion 4/2015 of the EDPS,2 does suggest a radically 
new approach towards the question of “the ever-increasing amounts of personal 
information being collected and processed in increasingly opaque and complex 
ways”. However, it does not offer new solutions to get out of the deadlock. On the 
contrary, it presents the same, well-known framework that leans heavily on empow-
ered individuals, accountable controllers, and innovative privacy engineering. 
Neither does the General Data Protection Regulation seem to address the 
2 Opinion EDPS, September 11th 2015, “Towards a new digital ethics. Data, dignity and 
technology”.
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 inadequacies of the regulatory system nor bring any substantive changes in this situ-
ation, although consumers are granted the right to object to (profiling related to) 
direct marketing.3 Law is still based predominantly on the misconception that con-
sumers understand the rules of data collection, are well informed, and are digitally 
savvy enough to be able to realize an adequate level of data protection themselves. 
Giving up personal data to get some product or online service “for free” is consid-
ered as an inevitable consequence of taking part in the digital world of today.
Legal authors have struggled with the above-mentioned problems on current pri-
vacy and data protection laws. Some of them propose, for example, a more flexible 
regulation of data protection by introducing a less strict form of consent (Schermer 
et al. 2014). Others discuss a proprietary approach vesting a property right on per-
sonal data (Prins 2006; Purtova 2011), or a “privacy 2.0 approach”, which leaves 
less room for the principle of purpose limitation;4 or, rules of unfair trading prac-
tices could be an alternative for privacy regulation (Hartzog and Solove 2015).
However, the proposed solutions do not offer a truly satisfactory solution to the 
concerns the majority of consumers experience. We do not believe that these prob-
lems can be addressed simply by adjusting the conditions within which the data 
market operates. Even if the solutions proposed resulted in fair background condi-
tions, well-informed consumers, a transparent market, explicit consent, even the 
possibility for consumers to vest property rights to their own data, the aversion, and 
moral concerns on the commodification and commercialization of personal data 
will not disappear. We encounter what lies beyond simple market-driven practices. 
This leads to the question whether there may be “some things that money should not 
buy?” (Sandel 2013).
Our conclusion is that privacy law and data protection rules alone do not offer 
enough protection to consumers who are concerned that their identities are frag-
mented into marketable parts and feel uneasy having to sell those parts whenever 
they are online. This unease can neither be explained by the single fact that people 
feel coerced to sell their data in exchange for (free) online services and conse-
quently lose control over the process, nor can this be addressed by simply adjusting 
the market conditions, as liberal consent theorists believe. Other dimensions of life 
than privacy are at stake here, selling data per se can be more fundamentally, intrin-
sically degrading.
3 REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation). Art 21 (2): Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data 
subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or 
her for such marketing, which includes profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct 
marketing.
4 Moerel and Prins (2015).
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4  Body Parts and Data
We believe that looking into a different field of law, namely biotechnology law, and 
the role human dignity plays in this field may help us articulate new approaches to 
data protection. Human dignity is commonly approached from two perspectives. 
One is dignity as empowerment, as respect for autonomy. We use dignity here in 
another sense, viz. dignity as a constraint, as protection against 
instrumentalization.
It may seem infeasible to bridge the conceptual gap between the human body and 
personal information, but as already touched upon in the introduction this might be 
less far-fetched than it seems. Obviously, the legal status of human body parts does 
not correspond with the status of personal data entirely, but there are good grounds 
to make the comparison.
Current technologies have enabled medical science to isolate, process, change, 
and exploit parts of the body (like organs, blood, embryos, stem cells, and tissues) 
to be used for medical, scientific, and commercial purposes. Parts that previously 
were inextricably linked to the human body are now considered as a useful resource. 
This process of objectifying the individual has enabled the industry to extract, use, 
and market body parts without reference to the person involved. It is often observed 
that here practices are permeated by commercial metaphors. These metaphors in 
biotechnology reflect the reduction of the person into marketable body parts: “bod-
ies are mined like a resource and organs are harvested like a crop” (Andrews and 
Nelkin 1998). This process shows resemblance with the harvesting of personal data 
in the context of big data applications, and considered by the companies as the “oil 
of the internet”.
The developments in the domain of medical biotechnology have put pressure on 
the idea of the unity of the person and the body. Just like the development of Big 
Data practices and datafication have turned persons into (data-)objects, packages of 
data that are subsequently stripped and fragmented, analyzed and sold, bio tech-
nologies have deprived the human body of its organic unity and have transformed 
the human body into a kit of useful (exploitable) “bio-materials” (Van Beers 2017). 
Both biotechnology and in data processing and data analytic practices, parts of the 
person or identity of individuals are separated from the individuals themselves. 
Both practices render persons into an endless source of use values: bio products and 
personal data. In this sense, the legal status of personal data and human body parts 
can be compared; or, as Mittelstadt and Floridi (2016) noted, “it is likely more ethi-
cally problematic to strip context from data used to track the behaviors of individu-
als than it is to remove identifying information from tissue samples for medical 
research”.
The ethical issues surrounding the human body have resulted in an extensive 
regulation of medical biotechnology provided with many legal prohibitions and 
restrictions. In (international) bio-regulatory instruments, the conception of human 
dignity plays a dominant (constraining) role where it prescribes the limits of modern 
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technologies (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2002). For instance, Article 1 of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe:
Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and 
guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and 
fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine
Article 1 and 2(a) of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights:
The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, 
as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is 
the heritage of humanity
Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their 
genetic characteristics
Article 1 of the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data:
The aims of this Declaration are: to ensure the respect of human dignity and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the collection, processing, use and storage of 
human genetic data, human proteomic data and of the biological samples from which they 
are derived […]
Article 2(c) and 3(1) Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights:
The aims of this Declaration are: to promote respect for human dignity and protect human 
rights, by ensuring respect for the life of human beings, and fundamental freedoms
Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected.
One specific way in which the concept finds its expression in the regulation of 
biomedical technology is that human dignity in itself is contradictory with the com-
modification and the trade of human body parts: the principle of non- 
commercialization. The principle that the human body is extra commercium applies 
to all parts of the human body: i.e. tissue, blood, organs, eggs, sperm, and embryos. 
The prohibition of so-called transplant commercialism is found in numerous decla-
rations and treaties,5 where transplant commercialism is defined as “…a policy or 
practice in which an organ is treated as a commodity, including by being bought or 
sold or used for material gain”.6 The trade of human cells, tissues, and organs is 
prohibited as it is inconsistent with the most basic human values and would imply 
the instrumentalization of the personhood that contravenes the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.
Moreover, payment for human body parts is likely to take unfair advantage of 
vulnerable groups of people and leads to profiteering and human trafficking. The 
principle of non-commercialization conveys the idea that people lack dignity once 
5 See Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Article 21 – Prohibition of financial gain: 
The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain. See Istanbul Declaration 
on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism 2008.
6 http://hottproject.com/about-the-crime/other-crimes/transplant-commercialism.html.
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they are used by others as mere objects. This draws upon the writings of Kant 
(1797):
A human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (…) but must always 
be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists 
(…). [H]e cannot give himself away for any price (this would conflict with his duty of self- 
esteem) …
The principle of non-commercialization is reflected, for example, in the practice 
in the Netherlands (and in the United Kingdom) that blood donors are not paid, but 
only modestly reimbursed for their donation of blood (Petrini 2012). The principle 
that the human body should be neither commercialized nor a source of gain seems 
no subject of discussion: many countries at least in Europe have laws that embrace 
human dignity as constraint and prohibit the purchase or sale of body parts.
Dignity as constraint and the principle of non-commercialization have up until 
now been left out of the debate on data protection law. Instead, in privacy and data 
protection law, dignity as empowerment and the principles of individual autonomy 
and consent, as instruments of self-determination, prevail. It is however precisely 
the former, constraining dimension that could be of help in trying to find ways to 
offer better legal protection for digital consumers. Introducing the dimension of 
human dignity as a constraint enables us to reconsider the legal issues in the discus-
sion on commercial use of personal data on the internet from a different angle 
(Brownsword 2007).
For the sake of this argument, an analogy must be drawn between parts of the 
human body on the one hand and personal data as parts of the personal identity of a 
human being on the other. The financial gain of the trade of body parts, whether for 
the person from whom these parts have been removed or for a third party, must be 
compared to the financial gain of data trade. Like in the bio-market, the prohibition 
of commercialization of data would apply to the individual whose personal data are 
purchased in exchange for free access to internet services and to the third parties: 
corporate entities of which the business models depend on the trade of human iden-
tities. The absence of any regulation where the parallel between body parts and data 
processing is drawn could be considered as a legal inconsistency.
5  Towards an Alternative Data Protection Approach
In this section, we elaborate on three alternative ways to approach data protection 
law, inspired by the law on biotechnology just discussed. Subsequently, we address 
health data and the concepts of paternalism and dignity.
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5.1  Explicit Consent for Processing of Health Data
It is considered a crime to sell your organs, but what if health data are sold, and 
people agree to this transaction? Article 4(11) GDPR has a very strict definition of 
consent:
‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous 
indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear 
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or 
her;
As already referred to above, Article 9(1) GDPR prohibits the processing of spe-
cial categories of data such as:
(…) the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a 
natural person, data concerning health (…)
There are several exceptions to this ban on processing of special categories of 
data, relevant for now is the following one:
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if one of the following applies:
(a) the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for 
one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the 
prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject (…)
Whereas Article 4(11) presents a type of consent that seems the most rigid pos-
sible, here the GDPR uses the concept explicit consent. This is not the place to dis-
cuss what this addition “explicit” entails, but we have not encountered yet someone, 
who could come up with a meaningful distinction between consent in the sense of 
Article 4(11) and explicit consent. This was also the outcome of a discussion during 
the November 2017 REDA conference in Nicosia, Cyprus.
Health data may be provided by the data subject for free, but normally there is a 
reward, e.g. a service is provided in return. In case of organ trade, if someone pro-
vides his organs without monetary reward this is allowed, but if money is received 
in return this is considered a crime. The rationale is that trade is only possible when 
there are at least two parties (and often third parties, intermediaries), so also the one 
who provides the body parts falls under the scope of the regulation. Also, and in 
particular, intermediaries and the one who receives the organ are condemned. 
However, to stop transactions, criminalizing the donor is considered necessary. In 
the context of data protection the donor, viz. data subject, is not the one on which 
the normative framework should concentrate from an enforcement perspective. 
Rather, the parties collecting and processing the data are the ones relevant here.
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5.2  Paternalism and Health Data
Paternalism is a recurring issue when regulation is aimed at protecting peo-
ple  (Moore 2013). In the context of organ trade, Conly (2012, p.  3) writes “We 
should save people from doing things that are gravely bad for them when they do 
that only as a result of an error in thinking (…) government should intervene in 
cases of obvious harm (…) I argue for paternalistic laws, and more specifically, 
paternalism of the sort that forces people to act, or refrain from acting, according to 
their best interests.”
One reason for a paternalistic approach is that in case of the sale of organs, 
debate is that genuine and free consent is impossible. To what extent is free consent, 
in particular in the (explicit) GDPR sense, possible in case of data processing? The 
answer is that often it is not. In some of these cases, a paternalistic government 
approach should be considered (Allen 2015). One is the right to data portability in 
the context of health data. If citizens get control over health data, they can also pro-
vide these data to interested commercial parties. We doubt whether citizens realize 
the possible impact of having their health data analyzed by commercial parties. On 
consent and health data, there is also a flip side to this issue. Since consent should 
be freely given, and in case of health data explicitly, data protection law can also 
prevent rather innocent processing activities. One example is an outing with the 
company you are working with. Assume they want to climb walls, and some health 
data need to be provided to the company of the climbing wall. The employer cannot 
get consent for obtaining these data, since due to the power relation freely given 
consent is not possible. As we briefly sketched above, we should strive for data 
processing that covers all sides of the spectrum: no or fewer constraints in case of 
rather innocent data processing, and firmer constraints and maybe even a ban for 
intrusive data processing activities.
Is it a task for governments to protect, more than under the GDPR is the case, 
citizens against the processing of (health) data? There is a thin line between justified 
government interference and unduly paternalism. Privacy advocates are easy targets 
for accusations of paternalism: “If you really considered it, you would not give 
permission!”, “Don’t click okay blindly.” Still privacy, and in the European Union 
even data protection, are fundamental rights (Van der Sloot 2017). Therefore, it 
could be considered the duty of government to protect its citizens in this respect and 
create further safeguards (Wisman 2019). But how, and to what extent?
A relevant angle for a refined approach to data processing is including ethical 
considerations. Roughly put, for legal and tech phenomena in general and data pro-
cessing in particular, at least three questions are relevant. The first is about the tech-
nology, what is possible? The second is about the law, what is permissible? But even 
within the limits of the law, ethics should play a role, viz. what is desirable? To some 
extent this is covered by the Article 5(1) GDPR principle “fair processing”. 
Processing should be fair, in relation to both a particular data subject and society at 
large. In relation to body parts, Kishore (2005) states “Arguments against organ sale 
are grounded in two broad considerations: (1) sale is contrary to human dignity, and 
12 The Role of Human Dignity in Processing (Health) Data Building on the Organ…
272
(2) sale violates equity (…) they reflect a state of moral paternalism rather than 
pragmatism.” We claim that sometimes data processing can be non-ethical, against 
human dignity. An example is the commercial exploitation of health data of vulner-
able people.
5.3  Dignity
In the GDPR, not much reference to dignity can be found, actually, only once, in the 
case of processing in the context of employment. Article 88(2) GDPR states “Those 
rules shall include suitable and specific measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
human dignity, legitimate interests and fundamental rights…”.
Post (2018) correctly observes that the GDPR is based on Article 8 EU Charter 
of fundamental rights, in which data protection is presented as a fundamental right. 
It is somewhat strange, amongst all those other fundamental rights, because the 
description is instrumental, even explicitly referring to fair information processing 
principles such as purpose specification, consent, and correction rights. This is dif-
ferent from the right to privacy in Article 7 of the EU Charter of fundamental rights:
In contrast to data privacy, Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union is entitled “Respect for Family and Private Life.” (…) protects the dignity of persons 
by controlling inappropriate communications that threaten to degrade, humiliate or mortify 
them. (…) Article 7 enshrines the same privacy values as those safeguarded by the American 
tort of public disclosure of private facts. It protects what we may call “dignitary privacy.”
These different approaches to data protection and privacy might explain why 
there is not room for dignity in the GDPR. It might be also the reason there is not a 
single reference to privacy in the GDPR (except twice in a footnote when reference 
is made to the ePrivacy directive). In earlier versions, privacy was mentioned. The 
rigorous “privacy cleaning” of the GPDR has also led to the renaming of the well- 
known concepts Privacy by Design, Privacy by Default, and Privacy Impact 
Assessment to Data protection by design, Data protection by default, and Data pro-
tection impact assessment. However, even from the perspective of data protection, 
as described in Article 8 of the Charter, the concept of dignity should not be left out 
of the picture totally. Article 1 of the Charter, after all, is about dignity, and as the 
Fundamental Rights Agency explains7: “It results that none of the rights laid down 
in this Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person”. Thus, there is 
even fundamental backing for looking at dignity in the context of data protection.
Hence, based on dignity, there are situations where individuals should be allowed 
to permit the collecting, gathering, and deriving of their personal data. We discussed 
Article 9(2)(a) and that the processing of health data could in some situations even 
be prohibited if the data subject gives explicit consent. The responsibility for 
respecting a prohibition based on dignity should not be placed at the realms of the 
7 http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/1-human-dignity.
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individual or data subject, rather the focus has to be directed to the controllers and 
processors of personal data (De Hingh 2018).
6  Conclusion
Were it not for the law, parts of the human body like blood and skin could be an 
inexhaustible source of income—just like personal data are today. On a massive 
scale, large parts of our identity and our personality are commodified and becoming 
the object of trade. The fundamental right to privacy and data protection do not suf-
fice to explain this discomfort or to tackle the legal issues arising from it. The com-
modification of our personal data as part of the online infrastructure of today does 
not affect the right to privacy alone but goes further by touching upon more funda-
mental conditions of being human, the deformation of which interferes deeply with 
the core of our human dignity.
Therefore, we propose to reorient the debate on data processing by introducing 
the notion of human dignity as constraint into the discussion. A prohibition of per-
sonal data commercialism (analogous to a prohibition of transplant commercialism) 
could contribute to a more future-proof regulation of data processing activities. 
Legal instruments similar to the ones concerning the human body could be applied 
to the trade of personal data as well.
Today, numerous (online) companies have developed business models based on 
the trade of personal data. However, none of the “potential benefits of the new tech-
nologies really depend on the collection and analysis of the personally identifiable 
information of billions of individuals”.8 The collection and processing of personal 
data is by definition neither indispensable when doing business on the internet, nor 
is data processing an absolute prerequisite for the functioning of online services. 
Against this background, there are no obstacles to limit or prohibit the use of this 
technology at least in areas where human dignity is evidently at stake, such as many 
situations where health data are being processed for commercial purposes.
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